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abstract: Adaptive responses to predation are generally studied
assuming only one predator type exists, but most prey species are
depredated by multiple types. When multiple types occur, the optimal
antipredator response level may be determined solely by the prob-
ability of attack by the relevant predator: “specific responsiveness.”
Conversely, an increase in the probability of attack by one predator
type might increase responsiveness to an alternative predator type:
“general wariness.” We formulate a mathematical model in which a
prey animal perceives a cue providing information on the probability
of two predator types being present. It can perform one of two evasive
behaviors that vary in their suitability as a response to the “wrong”
predator type. We show that general wariness is optimal when in-
correct behavioral decisions have differential fitness costs. Counter-
intuitively, difficulty in discriminating between predator types does
not favor general wariness. We predict that where responses to pred-
ator types are mutually exclusive (e.g., referential alarm-calling), spe-
cific responsiveness will occur; we suggest that prey generalize their
defensive responses based on cue similarity due to an assumption of
response utility; and we predict, with relevance to conservation, that
habituation to human disturbance should generalize only to pred-
ators that elicit the same antipredator response as humans.
Keywords: multiple predators, general wariness, antipredator re-
sponses, referential alarm calls, human disturbance, predator
generalization.
Introduction
Animals possess numerous adaptive mechanisms that
function in avoiding predation (Lima and Dill 1990), in-
cluding behavioral (Cresswell 1993; Lima and Bednekoff
1999), morphological (Harvell 1986; Hoso and Hori 2008),
physiological, neurobiological (Mitra et al. 2009), and life-
history traits (Basolo 2008; Lima 2009). For simplicity, the
adaptive value of these traits is usually studied in the con-
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text of an environment with only a single predatory species
present. However, different predatory species can coexist
in the same environment and can be defined as “types”
on the basis of, for example, their direction of attack (aerial
vs. terrestrial), their method of hunting (sit-and-wait vs.
searching), their habitat preferences (open vs. closed), the
specificity of their prey preferences, changes in prey-size
preference with age or sex, and so forth. Sih et al. (1998)
discuss the difficulties in defining and assessing the num-
ber of predator types but conclude that the “typical prey
species” probably faces attack from many types. The effects
of multiple predator types on antipredator mechanisms
are unlikely to be simply additive (e.g., Sih et al. 1998;
Soluk 1993), hence a theoretical framework is required to
derive predictions regarding the optimal level of an an-
tipredator trait in the presence of multiple predators (e.g.,
Lima 1992; Matsuda et al. 1993; Blumstein et al. 2006).
In this article we specifically examine the circumstances
under which the optimal level of a trait designed to avoid
a particular predator type is altered by changes in the
probability of occurrence of an alternative predator type.
Where only one predator type exists, the optimal level
of an antipredator trait is conceptually simple. If the prob-
ability of attack by that predator increases, the prey should
be more likely to engage in defensive behavior directed
against that predator. For instance, a foraging passerine
(e.g., a house sparrow, Passer domesticus) seeing an aerial
predator (e.g., a sparrowhawk, Accipiter nisus) passing at
a distance could be generally extra vigilant, spending more
time with its head up, scanning for an aerial threat, and
be more responsive (i.e., taking flight earlier) to any ap-
proaching aerial object. This scenario is more complicated
if the prey can be uncertain whether the predator is actually
present; in this case, there is the potential for “false alarms”
to occur: taking flight when the predator is not actually
present. These false alarms are both energetically expensive
and carry opportunity costs (e.g., loss of foraging time).
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Hence, the prey sets some threshold of responding that
optimizes its long-term fitness (i.e., that balances the cost
of false alarms against the cost of predation; Ydenberg and
Dill 1986).
Where multiple predator types exist, an antipredator
response to one type may vary in its utility for avoiding
other types. For example, an increase in the prey’s vigilance
behavior could defend equally well against another type
of aerial predator (e.g., a merlin, Falco columbarius) but
could be as bad as doing nothing when avoiding terrestrial
predators (e.g., a domestic cat, Felis catus). Hence, it is
possible that the optimal level of an antipredator response
to a sparrowhawk (for example) may depend on both the
probability of attack by sparrowhawks and the probability
of attack by other predator types. Whether this is the case
is hard to intuit, and this scenario therefore requires a
formal mathematical exploration.
We are particularly interested in whether, and when, the
optimal strategy for an animal includes aspects of “general
wariness.” The terms “wariness” or “fearfulness” have pre-
viously been used to refer to the general level of response
mounted by a particular individual or species to a range
of potentially threatening environmental stimuli (Boissy
1995; Blumstein 2006a). We co-opt the distinct term “gen-
eral wariness” from Adams et al. (2006) and use it to
describe the situation where variation in the probability
of attack by predator type A influences the probability that
a prey animal produces an evasive response to predator
type B, with all other conditions being held equal. (Below,
we flesh out this initial definition with more precision.)
For example, if the prey displays general wariness, then
an increase in the probability of attack from a sparrow-
hawk may lower its threshold for flying away from cats,
even though there has been no change in the probability
of attack by cats. This general wariness strategy is in con-
trast to the situation where the prey’s decision to take
evasive action for predator type B is unaffected by variation
in the probability of attack by predator type A: “specific
responsiveness.” In this case, the prey’s decision about
whether to respond as if only a hawk is present depends
solely on the probability that only a hawk is actually pres-
ent. When and why would general wariness be an appro-
priate strategy for an animal to adopt?
Modeling Framework
We employ signal detection theory (Green and Swets 1966;
Macmillan and Creelman 1991) to explore a simple model
in which a foraging prey animal (e.g., a passerine) faces
two predator types, has two types of signal available from
the environment, and has three possible types of behavior.
Each signal is actually an inadvertent cue, produced by
and associated predominantly (though to a varying degree)
with a particular predator (e.g., a “cat” signal and a “hawk”
signal). The three behaviors are evasive action directed
against each predator type (“anticat” and “antihawk”), plus
the prey’s default behavior in the absence of any threat
(e.g., foraging). The world can be in one of four possible
states (henceforth indicated by capital letters): no preda-
tors are present (NONE); one of either predator type is
present (CAT, HAWK); or both types are present (BOTH;
see table 1). We shall assume that the expected fitness costs
of a particular behavior in a particular state are fixed. Thus,
for any given situation (e.g., hawk present, cat absent),
there is a clearly defined optimal behavior.
Signals Cueing the Presence of a Predator
Since the environment is assumed to be “noisy,” the prey
animal does not know the state of the world with certainty.
We assume instead that it has access to two basic types of
temporally defined information: long-term, baseline
(prior) information on predation probability (we term this
the “wider context”) and current (posterior) information
on predation probability. The first represents an assump-
tion that the prey is storing and aggregating information
(genetically or cognitively) on the general probability of
predators in the environment. The second type of infor-
mation is provided by moment-by-moment signals or cues
from the environment. We assume that signals from the
environment can change rapidly, on the same timescale as
the prey must react, while the wider context changes over
much longer timescales, for example, over the diurnal or
seasonal cycle. Crucially, the signals available from the
environment do not indicate for sure whether, for example,
a hawk is present; they only convey some information
about the instantaneous probability that a hawk is present.
The prey has to use these probabilistic cues, together with
its stored knowledge regarding the wider context, to decide
what behavior is optimal for the current situation.
Formally, we represent the signal available to the prey
as a two-dimensional (2D) vector, s, defined by the mag-
nitude of the signal relating to each cue type: sp
. The signal conveys information about the pres-(s , s )cat hawk
ence of predators because the probability distribution from
which the signal is drawn depends on the state of the
world. We model this dependence very simply, assuming
that scat, shawk are drawn independently from Gaussian dis-
tributions with means and (where STATE canSTATE STATE¯ ¯s scat hawk
take the values NONE, CAT, HAWK, BOTH) and unit
standard deviation. Setting the standard deviation to the
same value for both signal and noise distributions is a
simplifying assumption, but setting it to the same value
for the signal distributions for both predators involves no
loss of generality, since the salient factor for these is the
ratio of the mean to the standard deviation. Thus, the
General Wariness and Multiple Predators 000
Table 1: Model parameters, notation and baseline values
Model parameter Notation
Baseline
parameter
values
State of the world:
STATE Current situation or state of reality; can be NONE, CAT, HAWK or BOTH N/A
NONE Situation in which no predators are present N/A
CAT Situation in which only a cat-type predator is present N/A
HAWK Situation in which only a hawk-type predator is present N/A
BOTH Situation in which both a cat- and a hawk-type predator are present N/A
Environmental signals available:
s Vector representing the signals currently available from the environment N/A
scat Strength of the signal predominantly associated with cat-type predators N/A
shawk Strength of the signal predominantly associated with hawk-type predators N/A
NONEs¯ Mean signal vector when no predators are present (1, 1)
CATs¯ Mean signal vector when only a cat is present (3, 1)
HAWKs¯ Mean signal vector when only a hawk is present (1, 3)
BOTHs¯ Mean signal vector when both a cat and a hawk are present (3, 3)
Information regarding the state
of the world:
P(STATE) A priori probability of the STATE situation
pcat Prior probability that a cat is present, assumed to be independent of
whether hawks are also present
.1
phawk Prior probability that a hawk is present, assumed to be independent of
whether cats are also present
.1
P(NONE) Prior probability that no predators are present .81
P(HAWK) Prior probability that only a hawk is present .09
P(CAT) Prior probability that only a cat is present .09
P(BOTH) Prior probability that both predator types are present .01
P(STATEFs) The posterior probability of the STATE situation, given the signal vector s N/A
P(NONEFs) For example, is the posterior probability that only a hawk isP(HAWKFs)
present, taking into account both the prior probability of hawks occur-
ring and the information available from environmental cues
P(HAWKFs)
P(CATFs)
)P(BOTHFs
Fitness payoffs for behavioral
decisions given the state of
the world (see table 2):
w(noneFNONE) Fitness payoff for continuing to forage, i.e., taking no evasive action 0
w(noneFCAT) Fitness payoff for taking no action when only a cat is present 10
w(noneFHAWK) Fitness payoff for taking no action when only a hawk is present 10
w(noneFBOTH) Fitness payoff for taking no action when both predators are present 12
w(catFNONE) Fitness payoff for an unnecessary anticat response 1
w(catFCAT) Fitness payoff for recognizing and avoiding a cat 1
w(catFHAWK) Fitness payoff for acting inappropriately in avoiding a hawk 10
w(catFBOTH) Fitness payoff for avoiding a cat but failing to avoid a hawk 12
w(hawkFNONE) Fitness payoff for an unnecessary antihawk response 1
w(hawkFCAT) Fitness payoff for acting inappropriately in avoiding a cat 10
w(hawkFHAWK) Fitness payoff for recognizing and avoiding a hawk 1
w(hawkFBOTH) Fitness payoff for avoiding a hawk but failing to avoid a cat 12
probability density for the 2D signal s, when the current
state of the world is STATE, is
P(sFSTATE)p P(s FSTATE) # P(s FSTATE), (1)cat hawk
where
1
STATE 2¯P(s FSTATE)p exp [0.5(s  s ) ] (2)cat cat cat2p
and similarly for shawk (fig. 1).
Since we have chosen to keep a constant unit standard
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Figure 1: A sample none/hawk decision threshold when cats are irrelevant. Loci of constant posterior probability ratio
are straight lines in signal space, orthogonal to the expected signal vector produced by a hawk relative to theP(sFNONE)/P(sFHAWK)
noise signal, that is, the line joining to .NONE HAWK¯ ¯s s
deviation, the clarity of the signals is set by the values
chosen for their means. Since there are two signal com-
ponents and four states, we need to specify eight values
of . These correspond to the positions of fourSTATEs¯component
points on the two-dimensional space representing the sig-
nal (fig. 2). Since the mean signal in the NONE state
defines a baseline, the behavior of the model is defined by
the remaining 6 independent values (plus the payoff ma-
trix, see below).
Independent versus Ambiguous Signals
We have labeled the two components of the signal scat and
shawk, assuming that each is indicative predominantly of
one particular predator type. The degree to which this is
true is set by the values chosen for the means, , inSTATEs¯
each world-state. If each signal component is caused by
only one predator type, then the mean value of scat depends
only on whether or not a cat is present, and the mean
value of shawk depends only on whether or not a hawk is
present. Graphically, in this case the lines joining toNONEs¯
and will be parallel to the shawk and scat axes,
HAWK CAT¯ ¯s s
respectively (as in fig. 2). When this is not the case, at
least one of the predators produces a signal that, on av-
erage, comprises both signal components. We refer to this
as cue ambiguity and consider specific examples in “Re-
sults” (fig. 3B).
In nonmathematical language, each predator can cause,
in general, two types of signals indicating its presence, for
example, a shadow and a rustling noise. However, we can
vary how strongly the signals are associated with one or
the other predator. For example, in the “separate signals”
condition we can set the model such that the hawk causes
a strong “shadow” signal and no “rustle” signal (and vice
versa for the cat; fig. 2). At the other extreme, the cues
from each predator are exactly the same (maximally am-
biguous) and differentiating them on the basis of the re-
ceived signal is impossible. Between these extremes each
signal is in general associated more strongly with one or
the other predator; for example, a hawk, may normally
cause a strong shadow signal and only a weak rustle signal.
A Priori Probabilities
As well as constantly updated information provided by
these signals, we assume that the prey also has separate
prior probability estimates for each predator in the model
(the “wider context”). In all the simulations presented in
this article, these priors are independent: that is, the a
priori probability that both predators are present is simply
the product of the a priori probability that either individ-
ually is present. Thus, if we write pcat, phawk for the a priori
probability of each predator type, then
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Figure 2: A, Reducing the inappropriateness of active responses to the incorrect predator favors general wariness as the optimal defensive
strategy. The horizontal axis shows the strength of the “cat” signal, scat, and the vertical axis shows the strength of the “hawk” signal, shawk,
and these constitute the vector s. The shading represents the optimal behavior of the prey for each s (see the adjacent key): none p no
antipredator response; cat p anticat behavior; hawk p antihawk behavior. For comparison, the decision thresholds from the left-hand
column are overlaid on subsequent panels (as black lines). Black dots indicate (bottom left), (top left), (bottom right), andNONE HAWK CAT¯ ¯ ¯s s s
(top right). The model parameter values are as per table 1 except for those indicated above each panel; in particular,BOTHs¯ w(noneFCAT)
and are held constant at 10 throughout. B, Reducing the inappropriateness of one of the active responses while holdingw(noneFHAWK)
the other constant favors general wariness but only in the general antipredator response. The model parameter values are as per table 1
except for those indicated above each panel.
P(CAT)p p # (1 p ), (3a)cat hawk
P(HAWK)p p # (1 p ), (3b)hawk cat
P(BOTH)p p # p , (3c)cat hawk
P(NONE)p (1 p ) # (1 p ), (3d)cat hawk
where P(CAT) and P(HAWK) are the exclusive prior prob-
abilities of the cat and hawk, respectively, occurring;
P(BOTH) is the prior probability that they both occur;
and P(NONE) is the prior probability that neither is
present.
The prey combines information provided by the two
signals with its own stored priors to estimate the proba-
bility that each predator type is present. According to
Bayes’s theorem, the posterior probability that the world
is in a particular state (e.g., only cat present), given a
particular signal s, is proportional to
P(STATE) # P(sFSTATE)
P(STATEFs)p , (4)
P(s)
where
P(s)p P(STATE)P(sFSTATE). (5)
STATE
Term P(STATE) is the a priori probability of a particular
state. As outlined above, is the probability ofP(sFSTATE)
receiving a signal s when the world is in that state (eq.
[1]), and P(s) is the a priori probability of obtaining the
particular signal vector s.
Payoff Matrix
The optimal behavior in any given situation depends not
only on these probabilities but on the expected costs as-
sociated with each behavior. Given a particular signal vec-
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Figure 3: A, Decreasing the danger posed by one of the predators (the hawk) can lead to general wariness but only in its response to the
more dangerous predator (the cat) and only when the less dangerous predator is relatively innocuous. The prey does not respond to cues
of the less dangerous predator once it is completely innocuous. B, Decreasing the danger posed by one of the predators (the hawk) causes
a very small favoring of general wariness when predator cues are ambiguous . However, ambiguous cuesCAT HAWK¯ ¯(s p (3, 1.5), s p (1.5, 3))
from an entirely innocuous “predator” can inhibit the active response to a dangerous predator. The model parameter values are as per
table 1 except for those indicated above each column; those defining cue ambiguity are as described above; and ,w(noneFBOTH)p 10
.w(hawkFBOTH)p 10
tor, , the prey can make three potential re-sp (s , s )cat hawk
sponses (actions are denoted in lower case): continue
foraging, none; perform behavior cat, a suitable response
to a cat (e.g., fly into a tall tree); or perform behavior
hawk, a suitable response to a hawk (e.g., fly into dense
cover). As per the standard signal detection theory model,
each of these behaviors carries some payoff dependent on
their level of suitability as a response given the real state
of the world. We write for the utility ofw(actionFSTATE)
behavior action in situation STATE (see tables 1, 2).
Different choices of utility value for w describe different
situations, for example, the relative danger of each pred-
ator and the protection offered by each behavior. In order
to make the model suitable for the predation situation we
have described, we require at least the following relation-
ships:
w(catFCAT) ≥ w(noneFCAT)
(behavior described as anticat must be better than doing
nothing when a cat is present),
w(catFCAT) ≥ w(catFHAWK)
(behavior described as anticat must not be less useful
against cats than hawks), with equivalent relationships
holding for the antipredator behavior: hawk. All the sim-
ulations presented in this article satisfy these relationships.
We shall discuss further conditions below.
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Table 2: Payoff matrix for the behavior adopted in response to the perceived signal, given the actual stimulus present
Stimulus present (STATE)
No predator present
(NONE)
Only cat present
(CAT)
Only hawk present
(HAWK)
Both predators
present
(BOTH)
Action taken (action):
Behavior none Correct rejection
w(noneFNONE)
Miss w(noneFCAT) Miss w(noneFHAWK) Miss w(noneFBOTH)
Behavior cat False alarm
w(catFNONE)
Hit (i.e., avoid predator)
w(catFCAT)
Inappropriate active re-
sponse w(catFHAWK)
Inappropriate active
response
w(catFHAWK)
Behavior hawk False alarm
w(hawkFNONE)
Inappropriate active re-
sponse w(hawkFCAT)
Hit (i.e., avoid predator)
w(hawkFHAWK)
Inappropriate active
response
w(hawkFCAT)
Expected Payoffs
We can now define the expected fitness payoffs,
, if the prey performs behavior action in re-W(actionFs)
sponse to the particular signal vector s. This is simply the
fitness payoff for that behavior given that the world is in
a particular state, weighted by the probability that the
world is in that state, averaged over the four possible states:
W(actionFs)p P(STATEFs)
STATE (6)
# w(actionFSTATE).
The probability of each state is derived from the avail-
able signals and the predator prior probabilities, as spec-
ified in equation (4). Thus, we can expand equation (6)
into
1
W(actionFs)p P(STATE)
P(s) STATE (7)
# P(sFSTATE) # w(actionFSTATE).
Calculating the Optimal Response
We define the optimal response as that which yields the
maximum expected utility (Green and Swets 1966), that
is, the action that maximizes for the givenW(actionFs)
signal vector s. All payoffs are inversely proportional to
the a priori probability of the signal, P(s), but since this
is the same for all actions, it does not affect which response
is optimal and thus has no effect on our results. We solve
numerically to find the optimal response for each signal
vector over the range from (0, 0) to the upper bound
(defined by the mean signal vector when either one or
both predators are present, plus one standard deviation of
the noise). The results are represented graphically in de-
cision graphs such as figure 2. These graphs show the
optimal behavioral response for a given signal vector s,
shown over the range of values s can take.
Location of the Decision Thresholds
In reality, the prey’s antipredator behavior may vary in a
continuous fashion (e.g., scanning frequency) but in our
simplified model, the prey switches between discrete be-
havioral choices. Thus the prey’s overall behavioral strategy
is defined by the decision thresholds, the key signal values
at which it switches from one behavior to another. These
decision thresholds are marked in the left-hand panel in
figure 2A with heavy black lines separating the shaded
regions.
Defining General Wariness and Specific Responsiveness
Given our model premise, we can now begin to define the
terms “general wariness” and “specific responsiveness”
more precisely. We say that the prey is responding spe-
cifically to hawks if the decision threshold between its
default behavior none and antihawk action hawk is un-
affected by the existence of cats. For a prey animal dem-
onstrating specific responsiveness to hawks, the none/hawk
threshold is independent of the prior probability of cats,
pcat. That is, the decision threshold for hawk behavior for
any value of pcat is the same as for .p p 0cat
The decision thresholds correspond to an exact balance
between the expected fitness costs of the two behaviors.
The decision threshold between none and hawk actions,
for example, is given by the values of the signal vectors s
which satisfy
W(noneFs)p W(hawkFs).
From equation (7) we see that this requires
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1
P(STATE)P(sFSTATE)
P(s) STATE (8)
# [w(noneFSTATE) w(hawkFSTATE)]p 0.
Note that the value of P(s), being the same for all possible
actions at a given signal value, cancels out. Then expanding
out the sum over possible states, we have
P(NONEFs)[w(noneFNONE) w(hawkFNONE)]
 P(HAWKFs)[w(noneFHAWK) w(hawkFHAWK)]
 P(CATFs)[w(noneFCAT) w(hawkFCAT)]
 P(BOTHFs)[w(noneFBOTH) w(hawkFBOTH)]p 0.
(9)
If cats never occur, then both P(CATFs) and P(BOTHFs)
are zero. The none/hawk decision boundary is therefore
simply the set of signal values s satisfying
P(HAWKFs)
P(NONEFs) (10)
[w(noneFNONE) w(hawkFNONE)]
p .
[w(hawkFHAWK) w(noneFHAWK)]
Equation (10) relates to the situation when cats do not
exist ( ). In this case, it is obvious that the decisionp p 0cat
to switch from the default behavior none to evasive be-
havior hawk should depend only on the relative proba-
bilities that the coast is clear or that a hawk is present,
given the available information, that is, on
. If an animal’s none/hawk de-P(HAWKFs)/P(NONEFs)
cision threshold continues to depend only on the ratio
even when cats do exist (P(HAWKFs)/P(NONEFs) p 1cat
), we define the animal as responding specifically to the0
threat of hawks. Note that hawk is defined to be the
appropriate behavior when only a hawk is present. It is
not appropriate behavior when both predators are pres-
ent. Indeed, in our default set of parameters given in
table 1, the utility of behavior hawk when both predators
are present is less than its utility when only a cat is present
( p 1, p 10, w(hawkFw(hawkFHAWK) w(hawkFCAT)
). This is why the relevant probability ratioBOTH)p 12
for the none/hawk transition is ,P(HAWK d s)/P(NONEFs)
not , even when[P(HAWKFs) P(BOTHFs)]/P(NONEFs)
) is nonzero.P(BOTHFs
If the prey’s decision to switch from its default behavior
to targeted antihawk behavior depends not only on the
ratio but also on and/P(HAWKFs)/P(NONEFs) P(CATFs)
or , then we say the prey is displaying generalP(BOTHFs)
wariness. In this case, the location of the prey’s none/hawk
decision threshold will depend not only on the prior prob-
ability of hawks occurring but also on the prior probability
of cats occurring.
Conditions Required for Specific Responsiveness
We can now examine the circumstances under which the
prey would respond specifically to hawks, apparently act-
ing as if cats did not exist when deciding when to switch
from behavior none to behavior hawk. From equation (9),
we can see that for this to occur when , two con-p 1 0cat
ditions must be met:
w(noneFCAT)p w(hawkFCAT), (11a)
w(noneFBOTH)p w(hawkFBOTH). (11b)
That is, specific responsiveness to hawks occurs when an-
tihawk defensive action offers no protection against cats
(eq. [11a]) and is as bad as taking no action if both pred-
ator types are present (eq. [11b]). In that case, the like-
lihood of cats is irrelevant when considering when to
switch between none and hawk. Therefore, substituting
equations (11) into equation (9) results in the same de-
cision threshold as before, equation (10), even when
. If this is not the case—for example, if hawk offersp 1 0cat
some protection against cats—then the animal should take
the prior probability of cats occurring into account. The
decision threshold will then not be given by equation (10).
By the same reasoning, the prey should respond spe-
cifically to cats when
w(noneFHAWK)p w(catFHAWK), (11c)
w(noneFBOTH)p w(catFBOTH). (11d)
If these conditions do not hold then the prey will display
general wariness in its cat response.
Graphical Signature of Specific Responsiveness
Conveniently, in our model specific responsiveness has a
clear signature on our decision graphs, which allows us to
tell simply by inspecting a decision graph whether equation
(10) holds or not (examining the effect of changing prior
probabilities would be equivalent but more complicated;
see fig. A1, available online).
From equation (4), the ratio of probabilities on the left-
hand side of equation (10) can be rewritten as
P(HAWKFs) P(HAWK)P(sFHAWK)
p . (12)
P(NONEFs) P(NONE)P(sFNONE)
Therefore, when cats do not exist, the none/hawk decision
boundary is given by the signal values satisfying
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P(sFHAWK)
P(sFNONE) (13)
P(NONE)[w(noneFNONE) w(hawkFNONE)]
p .
P(HAWK)[w(hawkFHAWK) w(noneFHAWK)]
Substituting from equation (3), confirms that this ratio is
independent of pcat:
P(sFHAWK)
P(sFNONE)
(1 p )[w(noneFNONE) w(hawkFNONE)]hawkp .
p [w(hawkFHAWK) w(noneFHAWK)]hawk
In our model, the distributions are Gaussian.P(sFSTATE)
If we substitute for from equation (1) andP(sFSTATE)
equation (2) into equation (13) and solve, we find that
the none/hawk decision threshold is given by a straight
line. We can see this graphically in figure 1. Loci of constant
are given by circles centered on . TheSTATE¯P(sFSTATE) s
ratio of to is constant along theP(sFHAWK) P(sFNONE)
line indicated in figure 1.
Thus, in our model, when the animal responds specif-
ically to hawks, the none/hawk decision threshold is a
straight line in signal space. This straight line must be
orthogonal to the line joining the mean signal when only
a hawk is present to the mean signal when no predator is
present. This neat result immediately enables us to tell
simply by looking at a graph of the decision thresholds in
signal space to see whether the prey responds specifically
to hawk threats. It does so if, and only if, the none/hawk
decision threshold is a straight line orthogonal to the imag-
inary line joining the mean signal values for the NONE
and HAWK states. Similarly, the prey responds specifically
to cat threats if, and only if, the none/cat decision threshold
is a straight line (again, orthogonal to the line joining the
mean signal for only a cat present to the mean signal
produced when no predator is present). If both these
thresholds are straight lines the prey responds specifically
to each threat. If either or both are curved, the prey dis-
plays some form of general wariness. As we will see in
“Results,” specific responsiveness and general wariness re-
late to each particular predator type since the optimal
strategy for the two need not be identical; the prey may
show specific responsiveness in its decision threshold for
antihawk actions, but general wariness in the decision
threshold for anticat action.
Results
Since our definitions of general wariness and specific re-
sponsiveness are key to this article, we reiterate them here.
Specific responsiveness occurs when the prey animal’s
threshold for taking antipredator behavior directed against
predator A is independent of the prior probability of pred-
ator B, that is, is the same as if predator B did not exist.
Equivalently, the decision to switch from the default be-
havior to anti-A behavior depends only on the ratio
, not on or . GeneralP(sFA)/P(sFNONE) P(sFB) P(sFBOTH)
wariness, by contrast, is a strategy whereby the decision
on whether to undertake antipredator behavior against
predator A is partly dependent on the prior probability
that predator B is present.
We can now examine the parameter spaces where spe-
cific responsiveness and/or general wariness are optimal.
The default values in table 1 satisfy equations (11a)–(11d),
and therefore, given this parameter set, specific respon-
siveness to both predators should be the optimal strategy.
First we examine the effect on antipredator behavior of
violating equations (11a), (11c) and (11b), (11d) sepa-
rately, and subsequently, due to assumptions of biological
realism, we will allow changes in the parameter set to
violate all four simultaneously.
Varying the Costs of Inappropriate Responses
What if a behavior designed to avoid a cat is also partially
(or wholly) successful in avoiding hawks? Formally, in
the model we simultaneously increase the utility of each
inappropriate action relative to the utility of a miss
( 1 , 1w(hawkFCAT) w(noneFCAT) w(catFHAWK)
), thus violating equations (11a) andw(noneFHAWK)
(11c). As the responses to predators become increasingly
general (inappropriate actions become less costly), then
general wariness comes to be favored as revealed in figure
2A.
We can also vary the costs of inappropriate active re-
sponses asymmetrically, for example, holding the hawk
response as entirely inappropriate (w(hawkFCAT)p
) while increasing the generality of the catw(noneFCAT)
response ( ), thus violat-w(catFHAWK) 1 w(noneFHAWK)
ing equation (11c) while continuing to satisfy the other
conditions, equations (11a), (11b), (11d). As one active
response becomes more appropriate for dealing with both
predators then general wariness is increasingly favored (fig.
2B) but only in relation to the predator for which the best
response is a general antipredator behavior (here, the cat).
An increase in signal strength related to the hawk cue
causes a decrease in the anticat decision threshold because
this behavior would also partially protect against a hawk
attack. Conversely, altering the signal strength relating to
the cat does not change the antihawk decision threshold
since this behavior would not protect against an increased
chance of attack by a cat: the antihawk response is specific.
As one response becomes more general to the point of
being effective for all predators, then it becomes the sole
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active response, displays general wariness and has a sym-
metrical distribution (since both predators are equally
dangerous and have equal prior probabilities; final panel
in fig. 2B).
Varying the Costs of Responding in the
Face of Multiple Predators
Next we examine the effect of violating equations (11b),
(11d) by reducing the utility below thew(noneFBOTH)
values of and . That is, wew(catFBOTH) w(hawkFBOTH)
ask whether general wariness remains optimal if, when
faced with multiple predators, doing something is better
than doing nothing (e.g., while holding all other payoffs
constant we can increase the cost of doing nothing when
two predators attack). Graphical representation of the re-
sults is not particularly illuminating (though see fig. A2,
available online, included for completeness) since, though
general wariness is optimal, the impact of violating equa-
tions (11b), (11d) is barely perceptible at print resolutions,
particularly so when compared to the effect of violating
equations (11a), (11c). In other words, the most important
factor in determining general wariness is whether doing
the wrong thing still has some benefit as compared to
doing nothing.
Varying the Ambiguity of Predator Cues
Having examined the effect of our derived conditions (eqq.
[11a]–[11d]) on the optimal defensive strategy, we move
on to examine the impact of changes in predator cue am-
biguity. Intuitively, before we began analyzing the model,
we predicted that if predators were increasingly difficult
to tell apart then they would be treated as a single predator
type, resulting in general wariness. However, it is clear
from the “Methods” section that this is not the case: the
equations defining the optimality of specific responsive-
ness or general wariness are independent of any cue am-
biguity. Even with ambiguous cues, so long as the re-
sponses to each predator type are still entirely specific (i.e.,
giving an antihawk response when a cat is present is as
bad as doing nothing), then specific responsiveness is still
optimal (fig. A3, available online, shows that the decision
thresholds are orthogonal to the line joining the mean
“noise” signal to each predator’s signal vector). Even
though it is increasingly difficult to discriminate between
the predators, it is optimal for the prey to assume that the
most likely predator type is present and respond appro-
priately, ignoring the alternative predator type.
Simple and Realistic Sets of Utility Values
Having examined the mathematical conditions necessary
for specific responsiveness, for the remainder of our anal-
ysis we will simplify the parameter values in order to make
the analysis more straightforward while respecting realistic
biological assumptions. In a real biological system it is
unlikely that all 12 utilities described byw(actionFSTATE)
the model would vary independently. For example, if the
prey uses a particular defense (e.g., cat) when both pred-
ators are present, it should be able to evade the “appro-
priate” predator but may be eaten by the “inappropriate”
predator. Its payoff will therefore be given by the utility
of this response to the incorrect predator. Thus, from now
on we assume that
w(catFBOTH)p w(catFHAWK), (14a)
w(hawkFBOTH)p w(hawkFCAT). (14b)
Furthermore, we assume that if the prey fails to respond
when under attack by both predators, it suffers the cost
associated with failing to respond to the more dangerous
predator:
w(noneFBOTH) (14c)
p min [w(noneFCAT), w(noneFHAWK)].
These assumptions remove three degrees of freedom by
making the three ) values dependent onw(actionFBOTH
four of the other w values.
Under these assumptions, the two conditions for specific
responsiveness to each predator (eqq. [11a]–[11d]) each
collapse to a single condition. When the three conditions
specified in equations (14) hold, then the prey will respond
specifically to hawk threats if and only if
w(noneFCAT)p w(hawkFCAT) (15a)
p w(hawkFBOTH) ≤ w(noneFHAWK).
Similarly it will respond specifically to cat threats if and
only if
w(noneFHAWK)p w(catFHAWK) (15b)
p w(catFBOTH) ≤ w(noneFCAT).
Note that we only see specific responses to the less dan-
gerous predator (specific responses are given to both pred-
ators if they are equally dangerous). For example, if the
cat is the more dangerous predator, in the sense that
, equation (15b) will notw(noneFCAT) ! w(noneFHAWK)
be satisfied and we will not see specific responses to cat
threats. We examine this in more detail in the next section.
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Varying the Threat Posed by Each Predator Type
Finally, we relax the assumption of equally dangerous
predators and allow for one predator that is less dangerous
(i.e., the cost of misses ( ) and inappro-w(noneFHAWK)
priate actions ( , ) are reducedw(catFHAWK) w(catFBOTH)
relative to the second predator). As we make these changes,
we continue to satisfy the biologically plausible conditions
of equation (14); for example, we hold andw(catFHAWK)
equal to each other as both are reduced.w(catFBOTH)
First, we examine the situation where there is no ambiguity
between the cues from each predator. As the hawk becomes
less dangerous, unsurprisingly, the prey chooses to respond
less to this predator (fig. 3A). Counterintuitively, general
wariness emerges as the hawk becomes nearly innocuous.
When the threat from the relatively innocuous predator
is low (i.e., the cue shows a low-to-medium probability
of this predator), the prey responds with the alternative
action because this carries only a low cost of being in-
appropriate but guards against the dangerous predator (the
cat). As the cue becomes clearer for the relatively innoc-
uous hawk, the prey begins to favor the more appropriate
antihawk response. Importantly, general wariness is op-
timal only in relation to the more dangerous cat; the prey
still shows specific responsiveness in regard to the less
dangerous hawk. Once the hawk becomes completely in-
nocuous ( ; lastw(actionFHAWK)p w(actionFNONE)
panel of figure 3A) then the prey no longer shows any
response to it, nor do cues of its presence alter the prey’s
response to the still dangerous cat.
It might seem obvious that when one predator has be-
come completely innocuous, the system is effectively a
single-predator system. However, when predator cues are
ambiguous, this “obvious” result fails to hold. When cues
are ambiguous, varying the danger posed by each predator
has a qualitatively different effect: general wariness is mar-
ginally favored, but an innocuous second species (i.e., a
nonpredator) can inhibit responding to the dangerous
predator. We examine this in figure 3B. Here, the cues are
ambiguous: the presence of the hawk causes a small in-
crease in the mean cat signal as well as a large increase in
the mean hawk signal. When both predators are equally
dangerous (the first panel in fig. 3B), the prey shows spe-
cific responsiveness to both threats, with decision thresh-
olds straight and orthogonal to the lines joining the mean
signals. As one predator (the hawk) becomes decreasingly
dangerous, there is a small deviation from linearity in the
decision threshold for the still-dangerous predator (the
cat). Significantly though, even when the hawk is com-
pletely innocuous (the final panel in fig. 3B), cues of its
presence can still alter the probability of responding to the
cat. This demonstrates general wariness but in a reverse
sense: cues associated with an innocuous species inhibit
(rather than augment) an active response to the dangerous
predator. Therefore, when considering the evolution of
general wariness/specific responsiveness, we must take ac-
count of not just predators but also innocuous species in
the environment that might resemble predators.
Discussion
We are interested in whether or not prey integrate infor-
mation on the probability of attack from multiple predator
types in behavioral strategies we term “general wariness”
and “specific responsiveness.” The crux of these strategies
is whether or not the probability of responding to predator
type A is dependent on the prior probability of attack from
an alternative predator type B. The prey shows general
wariness if the probability of responding to predator type
A varies with changes in the prior probability of attack
from predator type B; the prey shows specific responsive-
ness if the former is independent of the latter.
We have derived two conditions that must hold for
specific responsiveness to be the optimal strategy: a be-
havior designed to avoid predator type A must be wholly
ineffective against predator type B (as bad as doing noth-
ing), and a behavior designed to avoid one predator type
must be wholly ineffective when both predators are present
(employing a defensive behavior against predator type A
is as bad as doing nothing if both predator types attack
simultaneously). Numerical simulation reveals that the
former condition has the greatest impact on determining
the degree of general wariness exhibited in the system. In
other words, the more that antipredator behaviors become
general (suitable for avoiding all predator types), the more
the probability of attack from one predator type will in-
fluence the level of response to an alternative predator
type.
Our overarching finding is that general wariness will be
adaptive whenever prey are faced with some uncertainty
about the presence of multiple predator types (a signal
detection problem), when prey can make mistakes in re-
sponding to each type, and when those mistakes have dif-
fering fitness costs (i.e., an inappropriate response is much
cheaper than doing nothing). This explains why the degree
of cue ambiguity is irrelevant to the optimal strategy (figs.
A3, A4). Even when very uncertain about which predator
is present, it is best for the prey to respond with an action
appropriate to whichever is more likely to be present, ig-
noring changes in the probability of the less likely predator.
Additionally, the differential utility of mistakes explains
how general wariness and specific responsiveness can co-
exist as behavioral strategies when predator types are dif-
ferentially dangerous or antipredator responses are differ-
entially general (one specific and one general).
Interestingly, in the former case an increase in the prior
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Table 3: Key model findings in the context of the utility of two antipredator responses for avoiding two predator types, A and B,
and the characteristics of those predator types
Utility of antipredator responses
Predator-cue
ambiguity
Relative danger posed
by each predator Optimal behavior
Specific to predator A or predator B No ambiguity, some
ambiguity
Equal Specific responsiveness
Response to each predator has some
utility in avoiding the alternative
predator
No ambiguity, some
ambiguity
Equal General wariness
One general response that is effective
for avoiding predators A and B
No ambiguity, some
ambiguity
Equal General wariness
Response to predator A has utility in
avoiding predator B; response to
predator B is specific
No ambiguity, some
ambiguity
Equal General wariness in response to pred-
ator A, specific responsiveness to
predator B
Specific to predator A or predator B No ambiguity, some
ambiguity
Predator A more
dangerous
General wariness in response to pred-
ator A, specific responsiveness to
predator B
Specific to predator A or predator B No ambiguity Predator A dangerous,
“predator” B
innocuous
Specific responsiveness (no response
to “predator” B given)
Specific to predator A or predator B Some ambiguity Predator A dangerous,
“predator” B
innocuous
General wariness in the sense that
cues from “predator” B inhibit re-
sponding to predator A
probability of a less dangerous predator type can increase
the level of responding to the more dangerous predator
type, but cues from an innocuous species (rather than a
predator) can inhibit responding to the real predator (so
long as cues are ambiguous; see table 3 for a full results
summary).
Previous Theoretical Models
The findings from our model tally with, and extend be-
yond, previous models examining the impact of multiple
predators (e.g., Lima 1992; Matsuda et al. 1993). For in-
stance, Lima (1992) focused on the degree of vigilance that
animals should direct towards two separate predator types
and examined whether predictions varied dependent on
whether vigilance was nonspecific (it allows simultaneous
detection of both threats) or specific (vigilance directed at
one threat precludes the ability to detect the alternative).
His model demonstrated that increases in predation risk
from the presence of a second predator type generally
cause an increase in nonspecific vigilance levels relative to
those in the presence of only one predator type. This ac-
cords with our finding that when an antipredator response
is effective against multiple predators (i.e., “inappropriate”
actions are nearly or as effective as appropriate actions),
general wariness is favored. Additionally, Lima (1992)
found that under nonspecific vigilance, even a relatively
innocuous predator type could have a large effect on in-
creasing vigilance levels. We concur that nearly innocuous
predators can increase responding to other (more dan-
gerous) predators, but interestingly, we found this effect
can hold even when cues are unambiguous and incorrect
responses are entirely inappropriate (fig. 3A).
A complementary theoretical approach—the multipred-
ator hypothesis—has examined the impact on prey be-
havior of shifting selection pressures in multipredator sys-
tems, that is, the loss or gain of some or all of a prey
species’ predators (e.g., in island populations; Blumstein
et al. 2006). It highlights the interplay of selection and
genetic effects in maintaining antipredator behavioral
complexes (Blumstein 2006b) and may explain why an-
tipredator responses are mounted to rarely encountered
predators or innocuous taxa (e.g., Webb et al. 2009). Our
approach differs in that we assume that selection is con-
stant and there are no constraints limiting the attainability
of the optimal response to multiple predators (see Grafen
2007). There is value in both approaches, but we focus
here on the evolution of general wariness given our model
predictions based on behavioral optimality. Below we dis-
cuss how our predictions regarding the occurrence of gen-
eral wariness can be helpful in understanding current em-
pirical work.
Relevant Empirical Results
In contrast to the limited amount of theoretical research
regarding multiple predators, there has been a slew of
empirical research addressing their behavioral and eco-
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logical impacts. However, there are few studies (that we
know of) that have altered the perception of the probability
of attack by one predator type and examined the prey
species’ response to an alternative predator type, thereby
providing a direct test of general wariness as defined above.
If our model is correct, then studies involving prey species
with differential responses to different predator types
should show specific responsiveness (with general preda-
tor-response species showing general wariness).
The appropriate empirical studies, though limited in
number, tentatively uphold the above theoretical predic-
tions. Cheney and Seyfarth (1988) tested the generalization
of habituation of vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops)
to conspecific predator-specific alarm calls (those elicited
by either a leopard [Panthera pardus] or martial eagle [Po-
lemaetus bellicosus] which in turn prompt mutually exclu-
sive responses). Repeated exposure to an alarm call leads
to reduced defensive responding but this habituation effect
only generalized to novel alarm calls that relate to the same
class of predators (leopard/eagle) as the habituating call.
Seyfarth and Cheney (1990) then used the same paradigm
to examine the response of vervets to heterospecific (su-
perb starlings [Lamprotornis superbus]) terrestrial/aerial
alarm calls. They found that habituation to starling aerial
alarm calls did not generalize to vervet terrestrial alarm
calls but habituation to starling “terrestrial” alarm calls
does generalize to vervet aerial alarm calls. They proposed
that generalization of habituation does occur in the second
case since the starling “terrestrial” alarm call is given in
response to a wide range of predators and nonpredators,
both aerial and terrestrial.
Hinde (1970) examined the mobbing response of
chaffinches (Fringilla coelebs) to more direct predator cues:
a stuffed mount of an owl or dog. He showed that the
response could be enhanced by preexposure to the alter-
nate stuffed predator (e.g., dog followed by owl). Inter-
estingly, presentation of the owl had a greater impact on
the subsequent response to the dog than the reverse pre-
sentation and was more effective in generating the mob-
bing response when presented in isolation, suggesting it
is the more dangerous predator. Our discrete model makes
an analogous prediction for this continuously varying re-
sponse: that an increase in the prior probability of the
more dangerous predator has a greater impact—increasing
active responding across a wider range of cue stimuli—
than the less dangerous predator (fig. A5, available online).
Finally, Adams et al. (2006) also conducted a study look-
ing for general wariness (though they used their own def-
inition, their experiment equally tests our narrower defi-
nition). They found that prior exposure to raptor
vocalizations could alter vigilance behavior in crimson
rosellas (Platycercus elegans). However, this altered vigi-
lance did not translate into changes in the distance at
which experimental subjects took flight when approached
by a human. Our model predicts a lack of general wariness
in this instance due to expected differences in the utility
of escape responses (terrestrial vs. aerial predator
approach).
More work is clearly required to demonstrate that the
model predictions hold across various multipredator sys-
tems. As the studies above show, general wariness can
manifest and be measured in two ways: sensitization to
predation cues from one predator type can be generalized
to predation cues from a different predator type; or sim-
ilarly, habituation to predation cues can be generalized
between predator types. Below we outline fields of research
where we believe such tests might be fruitfully conducted
and where the model framework may be most usefully
applied to understanding empirical systems. Amongst
other things, the model supports hypotheses relating to
the evolution of functionally referential signaling systems;
makes predictions regarding the effects of anthropogenic
disturbance; and has broader implications for the existence
of generalization of antipredator behavior.
Functionally Referential Alarm Calls
Functionally referential alarm calls are specific calls given
in response to differing predator types; call receivers re-
spond to such calls with the appropriate antipredator re-
sponse. The classic case of such behavior comes from ver-
vet monkeys (as outlined above) that produce different
alarm calls to leopards, martial eagles, and pythons (Python
sebae; Seyfarth et al. 1980a, 1980b). Playback studies in
this system confirmed that individuals respond to the
alarm calls appropriately for the predatory stimulus that
initiated the call (Seyfarth et al. 1980a).
It has been suggested that functionally referential alarm
calls have evolved in particular species because of the in-
compatibility of differing responses to different classes of
predators (Macedonia and Evans 1993). That is, if the
utility of the correct response to different predator types
does not overlap, then selection should favor additional
information being provided in alarm calls indicating the
correct response choice. Habitat may play a key role in
shaping the general utility of antipredator responses (Mac-
edonia and Evans 1993), in determining both suitable
places of refuge and places/direction/imminence of attack
(Evans 1997). Macedonia and Evans (1993) highlight the
case of ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta) and black-and-
white ruffed lemurs (Varecia variegata variegata) which
occupy differing habitats (open semiarid vs. closed canopy
rainforest), are terrestrial to different degrees (partially vs.
largely arboreal) and differ in the specificity (match be-
tween predator identity and alarm call given) of their aerial
and terrestrial alarm calls (very specific vs. low specificity).
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Correspondingly, signal receivers in ring-tailed lemurs
show a behavioral distinction when played conspecific aer-
ial/terrestrial alarm calls whereas ruffed lemurs do not
(Macedonia and Evans 1993).
The parallels between this prediction for the evolution
of functionally referential alarm calling and the model pre-
dictions presented here are striking. The existence of mu-
tually exclusive antipredator responses to different pred-
ator types might drive the evolution of such alarm calls,
in tandem causing selection for specific responsiveness as
a behavioral strategy (Cheney and Seyfarth 1988; though
see Evans 1997) with, potentially, each type of response
requiring a different physiological mechanism for its
proper implementation (Mateo 2010). Referential alarm
calling systems therefore probably provide the best em-
pirical systems for testing a prediction of the existence of
specific responsiveness versus general wariness (Evans
1997 provides an excellent framework for how to conduct
such tests). Indeed, a more complex prediction can arise
in such systems; for example, aerial predator alarm calls
are given to other raptors and nonraptors that display cue
similarities to the main aerial predator in vervet monkeys
(fig. 1 in Seyfarth et al. 1980a). We predict that sensiti-
zation and/or habituation to cues from one predatory
threat (e.g., a martial eagle) should generalize to cues from
another threat that elicits the same alarm call response
(e.g., another raptor species) but not to a predatory threat
that elicits a different alarm call (e.g., a leopard).
Cue Ambiguity and Generalization
There are few direct tests of the prediction of sensitization/
habituation generalizing based on response utility, but
there is a great deal of evidence examining whether animals
generalize a predatory response (learnt or innate) from
known predatory cues to cues from other, often related
species (Griffin et al. 2000; Kelley and Magurran 2003;
Blumstein et al. 2009). For example, fathead minnows
(Pimephales promelas) when conditioned to respond to a
particular predator generalize this response to cues from
novel fish species (Ferrari et al. 2007). They do so in a
graded fashion related to the taxonomic relationship be-
tween the conditioned and novel species (and by proxy
the likely discriminability of chemical cues), not to the
level of actual predation threat posed.
This principle seems contrary to our model prediction
that ambiguity between predator cues is unimportant in
determining general wariness: prey seem to be generalizing
to ambiguous predator cues based on perceived cue sim-
ilarity (Ghirlanda and Enquist 2003), regardless of the re-
sponse utility. However, we argue that they may give the
same (though often attenuated) response to a novel, am-
biguous “predator” cue because they are expecting this
response to have some utility. This is a reasonable first
assumption given that predators presenting similar cues
are likely to be taxonomically related, might be expected
to attack in a similar fashion and therefore require the
same (or very similar) response. Hence, generalization of
antipredator responses may arise because, at the simplest
level, ambiguous cues tend to derive from predators re-
quiring similar defensive responses. Selection might there-
fore favor an initial response rule-of-thumb whereby gen-
eralization occurs on the basis of cue similarity. Learning
can occur postencounter (particularly in social species)
when further cues are available to confirm the accuracy
and suitability of the antipredator response (Kelley and
Magurran 2003).
Generalization and Conservation
Generalization of habituation carries two concerns for
conservationists: reintroduction to the wild of human-
reared/tended captive populations may be compromised
by the “tameness” induced and their consequent lack of
the response to natural predators (van Heezik et al. 1999);
habituation to significant human disturbance in natural
environments might lead to a reduced antipredator re-
sponse in wild populations (Coleman et al. 2008; Tuo-
mainen and Candolin 2011). The model presented con-
firms that both concerns are theoretically justified:
habituation to humans may well be generalized, but cru-
cially this generalization should be of most concern where
a prey species has only a single, general defensive response.
Those that have exclusive responses should only be gen-
eralizing their habituation to predators that require the
same evasive response as humans would (terrestrial mam-
malian predators being the likeliest).
A secondary question arises as to whether the prey spe-
cies concerned perceives cues from humans and predators
as similar or otherwise. For example, human disturbance
by fast-approaching or larger objects (e.g., motorized ve-
hicles) should be more likely to initiate flight in prey an-
imals since these are predator cues of great importance
for prey (Frid and Dill 2002). However, there is some
evidence that habituation to human disturbance does not
necessarily lead to a lack of discrimination of predators
vs. nonpredators (Coleman et al. 2008) suggesting that
maybe humans and predators might be easily discrimin-
able. We suggest that the modality of the predator cues is
of paramount importance in such studies though. Visual
cues (e.g., approaching humans/predator mounts) prob-
ably present sufficiently ambiguous cues to represent a
genuine signal detection problem (e.g., St. Clair et al. 2010;
Griffin et al. 2001). However, predator and human olfac-
tory cues are unlikely to share sufficient ambiguities to
represent even a basic signal detection problem (i.e., there
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is no overlap of the “signal” distribution). Auditory cues
likely span the range from highly ambiguous (e.g., sounds
of terrestrial locomotion) to completely discriminable
(e.g., species-specific calls, roars; note that completely dis-
criminable is not equivalent to “separate signals” in our
model since by completely discriminable we mean no over-
lap of signal distribution). Hence, empirical studies in this
field must be careful to assess which modality they are
concerned with since generalization of habituation/sen-
sitization in one modality need not necessarily correspond
to generalization in another.
Conclusion
We have shown that general wariness is favored in re-
sponding to multiple predators when mistakes in discrim-
ination are made, and those mistakes carry differential
costs. We argue that this principle can explain a diverse
set of empirical results deriving from the study of mul-
tipredator systems. Given the generality of the model, it
can also apply to related fields, such as the study of the
behavioral response of animals to human disturbance. We
hope that the framework presented here will aid research-
ers trying to understand the diversity in levels of general
wariness across the animal kingdom.
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“Almost everyone knows the Brown Thrush, or Thrasher (Harporhynchus rufus) of the Eastern United States—an abundant and familiar
inhabitant of shrubbery and a spirited songster, with some talent for mimicry. It belongs to the mocking-thrush group (Miminae) all of
which are famous for their vocal powers; the cat-bird, and the princely mocking-bird itself, are near relatives.” From “Some United States
Birds, New to Science, and Other Things Ornithological” by Dr. Elliott Coues (American Naturalist, 1873, 7:321–331).
